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Abstract
Petition system (named Xinfang in Chinese) is a typical 
Chinese system for citizens to express opinions and seek 
non-lawsuit remedies. It was originally positioned with the 
emphasis on expression of public opinions, but the general 
public expect more on its rights relief function. Over the 
recent 30 years, China’s economy entered into a period 
of high-speed development, and the redressal of social 
interest structure aggregated the conflicts of functional 
position of petition, which has surged the volume of 
petition letters and visits. The frequent occurrence of 
social contradictions resulting from blockage of petitions 
has seriously impaired social stability. Hence, it is 
pressing to readjust the functional position of petition 
and guide the system onto the legal track. In this paper, 
theoretical analysis is made over the strategy selection 
and dynamic game of both players of petition during the 
interaction process by building an evolutionary game 
model, to conclude an ideal state of stable equilibrium. 
With the theory base, suggestions are proposed on guiding 
petition onto the legal track.
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INTRODUCTION 
Petition system (named “Xinfang” in Chinese or 
named “letters and visits”) is a typical Chinese system 
for citizens to express opinions and seek non-lawsuit 
remedies and it is similar to the Swedish Ombudsman 
system (Bexelius, 1966), and Japanese complaint system 
(Deng, 2010). According to the definition given in the 
Regulations on Petitions of the State Council of the 
PRC (2005), the term “petition” means that citizens, 
legal persons or other organizations give information, 
make comments or suggestions or lodge complaints to 
the people’s governments at all levels and the relevant 
departments of the people’s governments at or above the 
county level through correspondence, E-mails, faxes, 
phone calls, visits, and so on, which are dealt with by the 
relevant administrative departments pursuant to law. We 
can see that, in the Regulations, the petition system is 
functionally positioned with the emphasis on expression 
of public opinions, but the general public expect that 
the emphasis of functional position can be put on rights 
relief. In its actual operation of petition system, its 
functions are under the influence of factors including 
evaluation of government officials’ performance and 
maintenance of social stability. The conflicts of functional 
position of petition have resulted in the surging volume 
of petition letters and visits (Wang, 2014). In recent 
years, in particular, China’s reform stepped into the deep-
water area, the policies on relocation, environmental 
protection, and social security, etc., which have to do with 
the immediate interests of the general public, witnessed 
constant adjustment, and the structure of social interests 
was also adjusted. As a result, the problem of petition 
became more prominent, and relevant interest groups 
conducted petition visits and haggling complaints time and 
again by making troubles and organizing demonstrations, 
and even taking extreme irrational acts or participating 
in collective social disorder, which occurred once in a 
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while, such as the collective suicide of petitioners from 
Sihong of Jiangsu, land expropriation conflict in Jinning 
of Kunming, taxi strike in Chongqing, and the conflict 
in Menglian of Yunnan. Once a petition problem is not 
solved properly, it is easy to give rise to some extreme 
sudden event, which may impair the normal social order 
and damage the environment for economic development. 
How to handle such issues in a proper manner serves as a 
test for the ruling wisdom and image of the government. 
From the perspective of the conducts of both 
petition players, petition is a conduct game between the 
government and relevant interest groups. Therefore, in 
the view of game, this paper investigates the strategy 
selection and equilibrium of both parties, namely the 
government and relevant interest groups. In the meantime, 
through the analysis of the model, proves the feasibility 
of guiding petition onto the legal track, and puts forward 
policy suggestions.
1.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The development of game theory can be generally divided 
into three phases: First, from the cooperative game to 
the non-cooperative game. In the 1950s, the study of 
cooperative game witnessed flourishing development, 
and the non-cooperative game also began to appear. Nash 
(1950, 1951) proposed the concept of “Nash equilibrium” 
in the Equilibrium Points in N-person Games and the 
Non-cooperative Games, starting the study of non-
cooperative games. Scholars put forward many non-
cooperative static game models, of which the most 
well-known is the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Second, from 
the static game to the dynamic game. Selten (1965), 
introducing dynamic analysis, put forward the idea of 
refinements of the Nash equilibrium with the concept 
of (subgame) perfect equilibria and the solving method, 
a breakthrough in the study of static games. The classic 
dynamic game models include Stackelberg Model. Third, 
from the perfect information game to the imperfect 
information game. Harsanyi (1967-1968) created the 
theory of imperfect information game. George (1970) 
built the Lemons Model, pointing out the asymmetric 
information on commodity quality for buyer and seller, 
improving the position of imperfect information game 
theory. Maynard (1974) proposed the “Evolutionarily 
Stable Strategies”, and Peter & Leo (1978) advanced the 
concept of “Replicator Dynamics”, which signified the 
birth of evolutionary game theory, when investigating the 
ecological evolution phenomena. Based on the step-by-
step improvement, the study of game theory has witnessed 
fast development and formed an independent system. 
In recent years, besides economy, the game theory 
have been extensively applied a great number of other 
areas including sociology, finance, politics, computer 
science, and evolutionary biology, etc., achieving great 
achievements. For instance, Duncan (1948) and Anthony 
(1957) put forward the middle voter theorem to study 
the voting behavior of voters, and Tirole (1986, 1992), a 
winner of Nobel Economics Prize 2014, investigated the 
conspiracy of operators and auditors based on the game 
theory. 
The application of game theory in the area of petition 
also witnessed many valuable fruits in recent years. As 
the petition system is a typical Chinese phenomenon, the 
existing literature is mainly written by Chinese scholars. 
Such literature can be mainly divided into two categories: 
The first one is characterized by theoretical analysis based 
on the idea of game. Yu (2009) proposed the “petition 
paradox”, pointing out that the government falls into a 
dilemma with regard to the petition system and putting 
forward suggestions on system reform. Yu (2011) believed 
that the definition of irregular petition visit is too vague, 
and this gives game rooms for petitioners and increases 
the petition control cost. Su (2011), taking the petition of 
a residential quarter in Shanghai as an example, pointed 
out the game logic that the government only supports the 
interest claims of petition groups under some specific 
conditions. Li (2012) believed that there are three players 
in the Chinese petition game, petitioner, local government 
and the state, analyzed the real operation of petition 
resistance, and revealed that the law is circumvented 
by implicit rules and civil wisdom, pointing out that the 
existing petition system is in gave predicament. The 
second one is characterized by theoretical interpretation 
based on static game models. Tan et al. (2010) built the 
game model for land expropriation conflict, analyzing 
the strategy selection process of landless farmers and 
local governments. Chen et al. (2012) built a static game 
model participated by three parties, analyzing the motives 
and behavior strategy of petitioners by bypassing the 
immediate authority over internet. 
The above studies of petition game are mainly based 
on China’s actual situation and concentrated on theoretical 
interpretation and case analysis. Although some analyses 
are made on the basis of building simple game models, 
they are all static ones. Therefore, no in-depth study has 
been made by building a universal model. In the existing 
literature, the game players are all “economic men” with 
full rationality, the government only pursues maximum 
economic benefits, and both game players have completely 
symmetric access to information. It is self-evident that this 
is much far from the reality. In fact, the process of petition 
game is a dynamic one. Governmental departments may 
take different measures according to a variety of factors 
such as financial strength, features of petition groups and 
social influence. Even the same governmental department 
may take different approaches to a specific petition 
issue in different stages of petition process. As a petition 
issue may involve complicated problems, it is hard to 
reach equilibrium once for all, and it is a prevailing 
trend that repeated games have to be done. In addition, 
the petition game process is characterized by imperfect 
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information and bounded rationality. Due to asymmetry 
of information, it is hard for petition groups to know the 
acting strategy of governmental departments, and it is 
almost impossible for them to predict the payoff matrix of 
both parties accurately before the game. Moreover, some 
people follow the others blindly in the process of petition. 
As a result, the petition groups cannot keep complete 
rationality. Apparently, it is not reliable to employ a static 
and completely rational game studying method, with which 
we can hardly describe the real situation of petition game.
In allusion to existing studies of petition game and 
particularity of the petition area, this paper believes 
that petition game is a dynamic process with imperfect 
information and bounded rationality. We should break 
through the complete rationality hypothesis and static 
game model and conduct studies over the interaction 
between the governmental departments and petition 
groups in the framework of evolutionary game theory 
(Larry, 2012) by referring to the dynamic game and 
evolutionary stable strategy proposed by Taylor and Jonker. 
2.  BUILDING OF EVOLUTIONARY GAME 
MODEL 
In the process of petition game, many stakeholders gather 
together for one or more common interest claims and 
lodge their claims to the government and relevant officials 
via the regular petition channels. When the interest claims 
cannot be satisfied, the core members in the group may 
organize and instigate more people to impose pressure to 
the government in a more drastic manner. In the process 
of game, the government may be “enlightened” sometimes 
and take some legal means to handle the petition issues. 
Sometimes, the government would, in consideration of 
stability or under pressure from all parties, take some 
people-based measures with low cost and fast effect. For 
instance, there would be some circumstances of “buying 
stability with money” and “bribing” petitioners. The ideal 
state is: The government maintains positive interactions 
with the general public. Relevant stakeholders express 
their claims rationally via regular petition channels 
while the governmental departments take normalized 
legal means to learn the opinions of people, alleviate 
resentment of people and relieve worries of people. Thus, 
in combination with the rule of petition and actuality 
of petition progress, the following hypotheses are put 
forward. 
2.1  Basic Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: There are two game players with bounded 
rationality: Governmental department A and petition 
group B. In the process of evolutionary game, the 
governmental department and the petition group conduct 
repeated games. 
Hypothesis 2: Governmental department A has two 
strategy options, “legal petition” and “people-based 
petition”. Petition group B has two strategy options, 
“regular petition” and “irregular petition”. The strategy of 
“legal petition” means that the governmental department 
controls the petitions issues according to law and handle 
such issues in accordance with laws and regulations 
strictly. It will not give more or less compensation due to 
the behavior and emotion of petitioners, and will impose 
punishment against the irrational extreme behaviors 
of petitioners. Of course, the implementation of legal 
petition requires paying certain “cost of normalization”, 
which mainly refers to the time cost and economic cost 
for preparing relevant legal documents. For instance, 
the current petition ending system1 is a kind of method 
for “legal petition”. In practice, moreover, the superior 
government will remove those petition cases to which an 
end has been put in the assessment of “irregular petition” 
volume. The “people-based petition” strategy means 
that the government handles petition issues based on 
experience and authority. Despite its randomness, it is 
characterized by fast rate and low cost, and no additional 
“cost of normalization” is required. Under the model of 
“people-based petition”, the government may, considering 
the social stability, give additional economic compensation 
sometimes, with a view to appeasing the agitated petition 
groups with out-of-line behaviors. The “regular petition” 
strategy means that the petition groups express their 
claims rationally via regular petition channels under laws 
and regulations. The “irregular petition” means that the 
petition groups impose pressure to the government until 
reaching their aims (Chen, 2014) resorting to repeated 
petition, petition by bypassing the immediate authority, 
petition visits and haggling complaints time and again by 
making troubles, and irregular petition visit to Beijing, 
complaint to foreign authority, and participation in 
collective social disorder. 
Hypothesis 2: The two game players have asymmetric 
accesses to information, namely imperfect information 
game. Due to the influence of a variety of factors, such 
as human and material resources, financial strength and 
identification of government officers to legal petition, the 
government chooses either the “legal petition” or “people-
based petition” strategy at certain probability. According 
to the situation and different claims of each petition group, 
the petition is inclined to choose the “regular petition” 
or “irregular petition” strategy. Therefore, suppose the 
probability for the government to choose the “legal 
petition” strategy is x, and that to choose the “people-
based petition” strategy is 1-x; the ratio of petition groups 
to choose the “regular petition” strategy is y, and that to 
choose the “irregular petition” strategy is 1-y. 
1 Petition ending system means that, where, after an issue, which 
meets the requirements for petition reception, is handled through 
legal procedure, the petitioner, who should stop making petition 
visits, still continue his or her petition visit, the special authority will 
check the petition issue and give a resolution to end the petition.
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2.2  Building of Replicator Dynamic Equation 
The interaction between the two petition parties is a 
dynamic process, and the governmental department 
and petition group conduct games under an uncertain 
circumstance with bounded rationality. Besides mutual 
influence, their strategies are also under the influence 
of game strategies of similar groups and the last game 
strategy of the group. Similar to the process of organic 
evolution, their respective strategies can be inherited, 
learned and adjusted dynamically. Based on the above 
three hypotheses, the meanings of major indexes and 
parameters involved in the process of game are listed as 
below (Table 1) and a payoff matrix is established for both 
game players (Table 2).
Table 1 
Meanings of Major Indexes and Parameters
Parameter Definition 
C The additional “cost of normalization” paid by “legal petition” compared with “people-based petition”, including time cost and economic cost for preparing relevant legal documents. 
Q
The social benefits received by the government if the government chooses “legal petition” and petition groups choose “regular 
petition”, with both parties maintaining positive interaction. Generally speaking, such social benefits are hard to estimate. So, just 
suppose that Q is a relatively stable constant in a short period, and the governmental authorities cannot change Q quickly through 
short-term strategies. With the accelerated process of a rule-of-law society, people have a deeper understanding to positive 
interaction, and then Q will increase gradually. 
R The cost needed to pay in settling petition claims, namely the normal benefits received by the petition group; when R>0, the claims are reasonable or partially reasonable, and when R<0, the claims are not reasonable. 
T Additional economic compensations given to an “irregular petition” group in consideration of social stability when the government chooses “people-based petition”. 
P The punishment imposed on irregular petition acts when the government chooses “legal petition”, which are generally disciplinary warning and administrative detention. 
D
The additional cost paid with “regular petition” compared with “irregular petition” when a petition group bring the government 
to attach importance to relevant petition issues, including the time and economic cost in waiting the handing of petition issue. 
Generally speaking, the handing period for “regular petition” is 60 days, but for “irregular petition”, relevant issues will be 
handled quickly as special cases.  
F Assessment conducted by a superior government to a subordinate government regarding the irregular petition acts due to “people-based” strategies within the latter’s jurisdiction.  
K
Assessment conducted by a superior government to a subordinate government regarding the irregular petition acts due to “legal” 
strategies within the latter’s jurisdiction. In current practice, some regions have abated irregular petition acts due to “legal” 
strategies in assessment. For instance, Shanghai Municipality does not cover the irregular petition visits of petitioners to Beijing, 
which have gone through the petition ending procedure. Therefore, it is common to have K<F. 
Table 2 
Game Payoff Matrix Between Governmental Departments and Petition Groups 
Petition group B
Regular group (y) irregular group (1-y)
Governmental Department A
Legal petition (x) Q-R-C, R-D -R-C-K, R-P
People-based petition (1-x) -R, R-D -R-T-F, R+T
For governmental department A, the expected benefits 
to choose “legal petition” and “people-based petition” 
are respectively  and , and average expected benefits to 
choose the strategy of combining “legal petition” and 
“people-based petition” is . Then, we have 
  UA1 = y(Q - R - C) + (1 - y)(- R - C - K) (1)
   UA2 = y(- R) + (1 - y)(- R - T - F) (2)
   U -A = xUA1 + (1 - x)UA2 (3)
The duplicator dynamic equation of strategy of the 
governmental department: 
F(x) = dxdt = x(UA1 - U
-A) = x(1 - x)[(Q + K - F - T )y + F + T - C - K] (4)
F'(x) = (1 - 2x)[(Q + K - F - T)y + F + T - C - K] (5)
In like manner, we can obtain the average expected 
benefits  of strategy of the credit group and its duplicator 
dynamic equation: 
  UB1 = x(R - D) + (1 - x)(R - D) (6)
   UB2 = x(R - P) + (1 - x)(R + T) (7)
    U -B = yUB1 + (1 - y)UB2 (8)
  F(y) = dydt = y(UB1 - U
-
B ) = y(1 - y)[(P + T)x - D - T] (9)
   F'(y) = (1- 2y)[(P + T )x - D - T] (10)
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3.   ANALYSIS OF EVOLUTIONARY 
GAME BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL 
DEPARTMENTS AND PETITION GROUPS 
3 . 1  E v o l u t i o n a r y  G a m e  S t r a t e g i e s  o f 
Governmental Departments 
(a) In the case of F - K + T = Q, namely, this is a special 
circumstance, the summation of the difference in the 
punishments imposed by the superior government 
based on assessment of irregular petition acts under 
“people-based” and “legal” strategies with the additional 
compensation to irregular petition acts under strategy 
of “people-based petition” equals to the social benefits 
received by the government under positive interaction 
between both parties. 
Then,  is always tenable, namely x remains at the 
stable level in all cases. The practical interpretation is: 
no matter the petition groups are inclined to “regular 
petition” or “irregular petition” in any ratio, the benefits 
received by the governmental departments in choosing 
“legal petition” and “people-based petition” are the same. 
That is to say, x is always the stable state of governmental 
departments in all cases. 
(b) In the case of F - K + T > Q, namely the summation 
of the difference in the punishments imposed by the 
superior government based on assessment of irregular 
petition acts under “people-based” and “legal” strategies 
with the additional compensation to irregular petition 
acts under strategy of “people-based petition” is larger 
than the social benefits received by the government 
under positive interaction between both parties. The 
practical interpretation for the circumstance is: in the 
early period of law-based petition, people only have a 
limited understanding to positive social interaction, and Q 
remains at a relatively low level. 
Then, suppose F(x) = 0, we can get x* = 0 or x* = 1 or 
y* = (F + T - C - K)(F + T - Q - K).
a) In the case of y = y*, then F(x) = 0 is always 
tenable, namely x remains at the stable level in all cases. 
The practical interpretation is: when the petition groups 
choose “regular petition” in the ratio of y*, the benefits 
received by the governmental departments in choosing 
“legal petition” and “people-based petition” are the same. 
That is to say, x is always the stable state of governmental 
departments in all cases. 
b) In the case of y < y*, then x* = 0 and x* = 1 are two 
possible stable points of x. If F'(1)<0, then x* = 1 is the 
evolutionary stable strategy. The practical interpretation 
is: when the petition groups choose “regular petition” 
in the ratio below y*, the strategy of governmental 
departments transfer from “people-based petition” to 
“legal petition” gradually. That is to say, “legal petition” 
is the evolutionary stable strategy of governmental 
departments. 
c) In the case of y > y*, then x* = 0 and x* = 1 are 
two possible stable points of x. If F'(0)<0, x* = 0 is the 
evolutionary stable strategy. The practical interpretation 
is: when the petition groups choose “regular petition” 
in the ratio higher than y*, the strategy of governmental 
departments transfer from “legal petition” to “people-
based petition” gradually. That is to say, “people-
based petition” is the evolutionary stable strategy of 
governmental departments. 
(3) In the case of F-K+T<Q, namely the summation 
of the difference in the punishments imposed by the 
superior government based on assessment of irregular 
petition acts under “people-based” and “legal” strategies 
with the additional compensation to irregular petition 
acts under strategy of “people-based petition” is smaller 
than the social benefits received by the government under 
positive interaction between both parties. The practical 
interpretation for the circumstance is: in the late period of 
law-based petition, people have a deeper understanding 
to positive social interaction, and Q will increase 
continuously, reaching a high level. 
Then, suppose F(x) = 0, we can get x* = 0 or x* = 1 or 
y* = (F + T - C - K)(F + T - Q - K). 
a) In the case of y = y*, then F(x) = 0 is always 
tenable, namely x remains at the stable level in all cases. 
The practical interpretation is: when the petition groups 
choose “regular petition” in the ratio of y*, the benefits 
received by the governmental departments in choosing 
“legal petition” and “people-based petition” are the same. 
That is to say, x is always the stable state of governmental 
departments in all cases. 
b) In the case of y < y*, then x* = 0 and x* = 1 are two 
possible stable points of x. If F’(0) < 0, then x* = 0 is the 
evolutionary stable strategy. The practical interpretation is: 
When the petition groups choose “regular petition” in the 
ratio below y*, the strategy of governmental departments 
transfer from “legal petition” to “people-based petition” 
gradually. That is to say, “people-based petition” is the 
evolutionary stable strategy of governmental departments. 
c) In the case of y > y*, then x* = 0 and x* = 1 are 
two possible stable points of x. If F’(1) < 0, x* = 0 is the 
evolutionary stable strategy. The practical interpretation 
is: when the petition groups choose “regular petition” 
in the ratio higher than y*, the strategy of governmental 
departments transfer from “people-based petition” to 
“legal petition” gradually. That is to say, “legal petition” 
is the evolutionary stable strategy of governmental 
departments. 
3.2  Evolutionary Game Strategies of Petition 
Groups 
Suppose F(y) = 0, we can get y* = 0 or  y* = 1 or x* = D + TP + T .
a) In the case of y = x*, then F(y) = 0 is always 
tenable, namely y remains at the stable level in all cases. 
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The practical interpretation is: when the governmental 
departments choose “legal petition” in the ratio of x*, 
the benefits received by the petition groups in choosing 
“regular petition” and “irregular petition” are the same. 
That is to say, y is always the stable state of governmental 
departments in all cases. 
b) In the case of x < x*, then y* = 0 and y* = 1 are 
two possible stable points of x. If F’(0) < 0, y* = 0 is the 
evolutionary stable strategy. The practical interpretation 
is: when the governmental departments choose “legal 
petition” in the ratio lower than , the strategy of petition 
groups transfer from “regular petition” to “irregular 
petition” gradually. That is to say, “irregular petition” is 
the evolutionary stable strategy of petition groups. 
c) In the case of x > x*, then y* = 0 and y* = 1 are two 
possible stable points of x. If F’(1) < 0, y* = 1 is the 
evolutionary stable strategy. The practical interpretation 
is: When the governmental departments choose “legal 
petition” in the ratio higher than x*, the strategy of petition 
groups transfer from “irregular petition” to “regular 
petition” gradually. That is to say, “regular petition” is the 
evolutionary stable strategy of petition groups. 
3.3   Evolut ionar i ly  Stable  Strategies  of 
Governmental Departments and Petition Groups 
The evolu t ionary  game be tween governmenta l 
departments and petition groups can be described with 
the system comprised of equations (4) and (9). As the 
circumstance of “F-K+T=Q” is only an exceptional case 
in reality and it cannot constitute an evolutionary system, 
we only discuss the other two circumstance here. 
(a) In the early period of law-based petition (namely 
F-K+T>Q), the governmental departments only have a 
limited understanding (Q is small) to the social benefits 
brought by the positive interaction between both parties. If 
and only if 0≤x*≤1 and 0≤y*≤1 are tenable, an evolutionary 
game system exists. Then, we have P>D, C>Q, and 
F-K+T>C in reality. The practical interpretation is: the 
regular petition cost, namely the economic and time 
cost of petition D, is very small, far smaller than the 
punishment suffered due to irregular petition. In the 
early period of law-based petition, we can take C as the 
legal cost, and Q the legal benefits, and legal unit cost is 
higher than the unit benefit. Meanwhile, the legal cost 
C is smaller than the summation of difference (F-K) in 
assessments of irregular petition data under people-based 
and legal petition strategies with additional compensation 
(T) to petition groups. Otherwise, there would be no 
power driving petition onto the legal track. Then, there may 
be 5 equilibrium points in the system. Specifically, E1(0, 
0) signifies that the governmental departments all choose 
the “people-based petition” strategies, and the petition 
groups all choose the “irregular petition” strategies; E2(1, 
0) signifies that the governmental departments all choose 
the “legal petition” strategies, and the petition groups 
all choose the “irregular petition” strategies; E3(0, 1) 
signifies that the governmental departments all choose 
the “people-based petition” strategies, and the petition 
groups all choose the “regular petition” strategies; E4(1, 
1) signifies that the governmental departments all choose 
the “legal petition” strategies, and the petition groups all 
choose the “regular petition” strategies; E5(x
*, y*) signifies 
that the governmental departments choose the “legal 
petition” strategies in the probability of x*, and the petition 
groups all choose the “regular petition” strategies in the 
probability of y*. Based on the Jacobian matrix method of 
Daniel (1991), a group dynamics described in differential 
equation, the stability of its equilibrium points can be got 
through the local stability of the system’s Jacobian matrix. 
Thus, the Jacobian matrix of the system is: 
     
  (11)
From equation (110, we can know that the determinant of matrix J is:
    .                  (12)
The track of matrix J is: 
 .                                                              
  (13)
With the above method, if and only if , the system has 
stable equilibrium points. Based on the result of Table 3, 
the system does not have stable equilibrium points. 
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Table 3 
Analysis Result of Jacobian Matrix (F-K+T>Q)
Possible equilibrium point
det J tr J
Result 
Value Symbol Value Symbol 
E1 (0, 0) -(D+T)(F-K-C+T) - F-K-D-C TBD Unstable 
E2 (1, 0) (D-P)(F-K-C+T) - C-D-F-K+P-T TBD Unstable 
E3 (0, 1) -(C-Q)(D+T) - D-C+Q+T TBD Unstable 
E4(1, 1) (C-Q)(D-P) - C+D-P-Q TBD Unstable 
E5(x
*, y*) (C - Q)(P - D)(D + T)(F - K - C + T)(P + T)(F - K - Q + T) + 0 Saddle point 
To sum up the strategies chosen by the governmental 
departments and petition groups under the above different 
circumstances and stability analysis of all equilibrium 
points, we can get the duplicator dynamic process (see 
Figure 1a) and the strategy profile shift (see Figure 1b) of 
evolutionary game. It can be seen that, in the game in the 
early period of law-based petition, the interaction process 
track involving players are related to the initial strategy 
state closely.
Figure 1a
The Duplicator Dynamic Process Diagram of Evolutionary 
Game In The Early Period of Law-Based Petition
Figuire 1b
The Strategy Profile Shift Diagram of Evolutionary Game in 
the Early Period of Law-Based Petition
According to Fig. 1a and 1b, in the early period of law-
based petition progress, there is not a stable equilibrium 
state in the game between both parties, but it is a cycle 
going round and round (I→II→III→IV→I).  
a) When the initial strategy is in Domain I, x<x*, 
y<y*, and x=1 is the stable strategy of governmental 
departments, and y=0 is the stable strategy of petition 
groups. Therefore, both parties move along (1, 0) and 
come into Domain II finally. The practical interpretation 
is: The governmental departments become increasingly 
inclined to “legal petition” while the petition groups 
become increasingly inclined to “irregular petition”. 
b) When the initial strategy is in Domain II, x>x*, 
y<y*, and x=1 is the stable strategy of governmental 
departments, and y=1 is the stable strategy of petition 
groups. Therefore, both parties move along (1, 1) and 
come into Domain III finally. The practical interpretation 
is: The governmental departments become increasingly 
inclined to “legal petition” while the petition groups 
become increasingly inclined to “regular petition”. 
c) When the initial strategy is in Domain III, x>x*, 
y>y*, and x=0 is the stable strategy of governmental 
departments, and y=1 is the stable strategy of petition 
groups. Therefore, both parties move along (0, 1) and 
come into Domain IV finally. The practical interpretation 
is: the governmental departments become increasingly 
inclined to “people-based petition” while the petition 
groups become increasingly inclined to “regular petition”. 
d) When the initial strategy is in Domain IV, x<x*, 
y>y*, and x=0 is the stable strategy of governmental 
departments, and y=0 is the stable strategy of petition 
groups. Therefore, both parties move along (0, 0) and 
come into Domain I finally. The practical interpretation 
is: the governmental departments become increasingly 
inclined to “people-based petition” while the petition groups 
become increasingly inclined to “irregular petition”.
Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that 
II and III are two ideal domains, in which the petition 
groups become more inclined to choose regular petition 
and the whole society is in a state of relative harmony 
and stability as well as positive interaction. We can see 
that, in the early period of law-based petition, when the 
point falls within Domain IV, the superior government 
should intensify the assessment of irregular petition 
acts due to “people-based” strategy in the jurisdiction 
of the subordinate government (F increases), and abate 
the assessment of irregular petition acts due to “legal” 
strategy (K decreases). Meanwhile, the subordinate 
government should, considering stability, increase 
additional compensation to the petition groups (T 
increases), reduce the “normalization cost” paid for “legal 
petition” (C decreases), and increase y* to speed up the 
strategy profile to move toward Domain I. When the point 
falls within Domain I, the government should strictly 
control the additional compensation to petition groups 
(T decreases), and make great efforts to reduce the cost 
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of regular petition (D decreases). In addition, it should 
impose severe punishment to illegal acts in irregular 
petition (P increases), and decreases x* to push the strategy 
profile to ideal Domain II. 
(b) In the late period of law-based petition (namely 
F-K+T<Q), governmental departments have a deeper 
understanding to law-based petition and a higher 
expectation to the social benefits Q brought by the 
positive interaction between both parties. If and only 
if  and  is tenable, an evolutionary game system exists. 
Then, we have P>D, C<Q, and F-K+T<C. The practical 
interpretation is: in the late period of law-based petition, 
the cost of regular petition of the general public is 
still lower than the punishments imposed for irregular 
petition. The legal strategy gradually brings into play 
its social benefits, and the unit benefit becomes higher 
than the unit cost gradually. The government becomes 
increasingly willing to handle issues with legal ways, and 
there are a decreasing number of circumstances where the 
government purchases stability with money (T decreases). 
Then, the system still has five equilibrium points E1 -E5. 
In the like manner, according to the Jacobian matrix of 
Daniel (1991), we can see that the system has two stable 
equilibrium points E1 (0, 0) and E4 (1, 1). 
Table 4 
Analysis Result of Jacobian Matrix (Namely: F-K+T<Q) 
Possible equilibrium 
point
det J tr J
Result 
Value Symbol Value Symbol 
E1 (0, 0) -(D+T)(F-K-C+T) + F-K-D-C - Stable 
E2 (1, 0) (D-P)(F-K-C+T) + C-D-F-K+P-T + Unstable 
E3 (0, 1) -(C-Q)(D+T) + D-C+Q+T + Unstable 
E4(1, 1) (C-Q)(D-P) + C+D-P-Q - Stable 
E5(x
*, y*)
(C - Q)(P - D)(D + T)(F - K- C + T)
(P + T)(F - K - Q + T))
- 0 Saddle point 
To sum up the strategies chosen by the governmental 
departments and petition groups under the above different 
circumstances and stability analysis of all equilibrium 
points, we can get the duplicator dynamic process (see 
Figure 2a) and the strategy profile shift (see Figure 2b) 
of evolutionary game. Likewise, in the game in the late 
period of law-based petition, the interaction process track 
involving players are related to the initial strategy state 
closely and there are two stable equilibrium states. 
Figure 2a
The Duplicator Dynamic Process Diagram of Evolutionary 
Game In the Late Period of Law-Based Petition 
Figure 2b
The Strategy Profile Shift Diagram of Evolutionary Game in 
the Late Period of Law-Based Petition
According to Figures 2a and 2b, in the late period of 
law-based petition progress, I and III are the two domains 
with stable equilibrium states, respectively pointing at E1 
(0, 0) and E4 (1, 1). In Domain I, the government becomes 
increasingly inclined to choose “people-based petition” 
and the petition groups become increasingly inclined 
to choose “irregular petition”, so obviously it is easy to 
cause conflicts and it is unfavorable to drive the progress 
of law-based petition. Thus, it is not an ideal domain. 
In contrast, in Domain III, the government becomes 
increasingly inclined to choose “legal petition” and the 
petition groups become increasingly inclined to choose 
“regular petition”. Both parties are in positive interaction, 
which is favorable to drive the progress of law-based 
petition. Thus, it is an ideal domain. As unstable domains, 
Domains II and IV are less ideal ones, superior to Domain 
I but inferior to Domain III. After a period of movement, 
it is possible for either of them to shift to the other three 
domains. We can see that, in the late period of law-
based petition, when the point falls within Domain II, 
the superior government should intensify the assessment 
of irregular petition acts due to “people-based” strategy 
in the jurisdiction of the subordinate government (F 
increases), and abate the assessment of irregular petition 
acts due to “legal” strategy (K decreases). Meanwhile, 
the subordinate government should, considering stability, 
increase additional compensation to the petition groups 
(T increases), reduce the “normalization cost” paid for 
“legal petition” (C decreases), and decrease y* to speed 
up the strategy profile to move toward Domain III. When 
the point falls within Domain IV, the government should 
strictly control the additional compensation to petition 
groups (T decreases), and make great efforts to reduce 
the cost of regular petition (D decreases). In addition, 
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it should impose severe punishment to illegal acts in 
irregular petition (P increases), and decreases x* to push 
the strategy profile to move toward ideal Domain III. 
When the point falls within Domain I, the government 
will not make adjustment to T, but should intensify the 
assessment of irregular petition acts due to “people-
based” strategy (F increases), abate the assessment under 
the “legal” strategy (K decreases), impose more severe 
punishment (P increases), reduce the legal cost of petition 
(C decreases), lower the cost of regular petition borne 
by the general public (D decreases), and decrease x* and 
y* to make the strategy profile fall within the other three 
domains. In general, we hope that Domain IV is large 
enough while Domain I is as small as possible. 
CONCLUSION 
The following conclusions are drawn by building an 
evolutionary game model: 
Firstly, the strategy selection of the governmental 
departments and that of petition groups are influencing 
each other.  In part icular,  the cri t ical  value y * = 
(F + T - C - K)
(F + T - Q - K)  de te rmines  the  inc l ina t ion  o f  the 
governmental departments in strategy selection, and the 
critical value x* = (D + T)(P + T) determines the inclination of the 
petition groups in strategy selection. 
Secondly,  the duplicator dynamic process of 
evolutionary game of petition varies in different period of 
law-based petition. In the early period (namely F-K+T<Q), 
the duplicator dynamic process of game between both 
parties is a cycle going round and round, and the strategy 
profile shifts in the four domains in turn. In the late period 
(namely F-K+T<Q), the duplicator dynamic process of 
game between both parties is not a cycle, but there are two 
stable equilibrium states. In addition, the position of its 
initial point influences its final state. 
Thirdly, the ideal domain also varies in different period 
of law-based petition. In the early period of legal petition, 
II and III are two ideal domains. In the late period of law-
based petition, III is the most ideal domain, and Domain I 
exists as an extremely awful domain at the same time. 
Fourthly, adjustment of parameters can speed up 
the movement of system and make the strategy profile 
reach a relatively ideal domain. The time for adjusting 
parameters varies in different period of law-based petition. 
Additionally, the model involves three kinds of parameters: 
Type 1, for instance F, K, P, C and D, always have the same 
direction of adjustment. Type 2, for parameter T, needs 
to be adjusted higher sometimes and lower sometimes. In 
the long run, in the late period (F-K+T<Q), the better the 
smaller T is. Type 3, for parameter R, will not influence 
the strategy selection and strategy profile movement of 
both parties no matter it is 0 or not (R=0, the claims are not 
reasonable; R>0, the claims are reasonable to some extent). 
ADVICE ON POLICY 
In order to push petition onto the legal track and handle 
petition issues in a better way, the following advice on 
policy are proposed in consideration of the current petition 
reality and in combination with the research results of 
evolutionary game model: 
Firstly, guide petition onto the legal track (increase 
Q). In the early period of law-based petition, the petition 
game enters into a strange cycle, and there is not an ideal 
state of stable equilibrium. The government puts emphasis 
on “legal” strategy now and then, and has to resort to the 
“people-based” strategy once in a while to “buy stability 
with money”, appease contradictions and disputes quickly 
and prevent petition issues from swelling and aggravation. 
Nevertheless, if the early period lasts too long, it would 
make the problem of “buying stability with money” become 
worse, thus damaging the confidence of governmental 
departments and petition groups to law-based petition. 
Therefore, the legislature should accelerate the process of 
legislation for law-based petition and advocate the law-
based petition with greater efforts so that the government 
and the general public can both realize the value expectation 
produced by positive social interaction. In the late period of 
law-based petition, the petition game goes out of the strange 
cycle and two stable equilibrium states come into existence. 
It is noteworthy that a “trap” (Domain I in Figure 2a) may 
appear here, and the government and petition groups lose 
confidence in law-based petition and become inclined to 
choose “people-based” strategy and “irregular petition” 
respectively. This indicates that we should, in the process of 
pushing the law-based petition from the early period to the 
late period, grasp the opportunity accurately to prevent the 
initial point from falling into the “trap” and ensure that the 
petition game can shift toward the only ideal state (Domain 
III in Figure 2a). 
Secondly, improve the petition efficiency (C and D 
decrease). The government may make petition channels 
more accessible in a number of ways, such as building an 
internet petition system, organizing visits to the public and 
receiving visits via video, so as to guide people to express 
their claims in a rational way under laws and regulations. 
We suggest the government to organize survey over the 
satisfaction of the general public to the government’s 
works regarding petition, accelerate the handling process 
of petition issues, reduce the time and financial cost spent 
by people on regular petition, and elevate the confidence 
of the general public to solving problems via regular 
petition channels. The working procedure for “law-based 
petition” should be refined and simplified to reduce the 
operation cost of works regarding petition, and more 
impetus should be given to the governmental department 
to choose “legal petition”. A petition information system 
networked nationwide should be established to intensify 
petition information management so that all petition issues 
are accessible for inquiry and tracking. 
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Thirdly, protect the regular petition order under law (P 
increases). The publicity efforts on Regulations on Petition 
should be intensified, and lawful regular petition acts and 
illegal irregular petition acts should be defined accurately. 
For the few illegal acts organizing and stirring up people 
to make petition visits and lodge haggling complaints 
time and again by making troubles, which seriously affect 
the public order, severe punishment should be imposed 
without compromise.  
Fourthly, normalize the handling of petition issues 
(control T). The petition issues should be classified 
carefully. The reasonable and lawful parts must be made 
up to protect the legal rights and benefits of the general 
public. For the parts not supported by policies, careful 
description on relevant policies should be given to the 
general public to win their understanding. Under some 
special circumstances, for instance the petitioners are aged 
and suffer from poor health and hard life, the government 
should give proper additional subsidies in consideration 
of fairness, equality and humanitarian. Under other 
circumstances, the acts of the government to “buy stability 
with money” without principle or even to bribe petitioners 
should be controlled strictly.  
Fifthly, improve the petition assessment (F increases, 
and K decreases). It is suggested to abate the assessment 
of irregular petitions under the “legal” strategy. For 
example, for the issues that have gone through the petition 
ending procedure strictly, relevant departments may refuse 
to accept the petition acts of relevant petition groups 
according to the principle of court “second instance as 
the final instance” and such acts will not be covered into 
assessment. It is suggested to intensify the assessment 
of irregular petitions under the “people-based” strategy. 
For governmental departments and officials that fail to 
perform proper acts, take random acts and formulate 
unreasonable policies or fail to enforce relevant policies 
as required, causing people to organize irregular petition, 
their responsibilities must be investigated, and the 
responsibility investigation should be intensified. In this 
way, the progress of law-based petition can be pushed 
forward in terms of petition assessment. 
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